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         Abstract:  
 
Up until 2010, SAF contribution to multinational peace support operations (MNO) has been 
very limited, due to a number of factors and internal contradictions. Principal actor pushing 
Serbia’s MNO policy forward should have been the MFA, however, in practice this has not 
always been the case. Legal framework, completed in 2009, failed to notice non-traditional 
actors of peace support operations. Still not fully represented in NATO, Serbia has just 
signed the Security Agreement with the EU. Yet, Serbia’s deployments abroad are fast 
changing in terms of character. With five years of delay, by the end of 2011 SAF will send – 
for the first time since the break-up of Yugoslavia – a designated unit to an MNO. 
Nevertheless, several issues, not having anything to do with horizontal cooperation between 
key actors will continue to hamper decision makers’ ambition for greater engagement.  
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1 Authors are researchers in the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (www.ccmr-bg.org). 
2 
 
Acronyms and abbreviations: 
BIC Bureau for International Cooperation 
CNS Council for National Security 
CPO Centre for Peace-keeping Operations of the Serbian Armed Forces 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
DIMC Department for International Military Cooperation 
DUN Directorate for United Nations 
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force Somalia 
HQ SAF Headquarters of the Serbian Armed Forces 
MF Ministry of Finance  
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
MNO Multi-national operations 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MoI Ministry of Interior 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Systems 
RAF Romanian Armed Forces 
SAF Serbian Armed Forces 
SLF Serbia’s Land Forces 
STANAG Standardization Agreement 
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
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Contribution to multinational peace support operations2 constitutes an intriguing 
phenomenon. Soldiers of different armed forces come in contact; work together; exchange; 
and learn one from another. It is hard to imagine any activity of (international and military) 
cooperation that affects individual servicemen and women in a more profound way. First, 
they interact with their colleagues who are most likely to be (if not always) representatives of 
organizational cultures whose attitudes, beliefs and values may not correspond to their own. 
This is especially true for UN mandated and led operations. As a result of adjustment comes 
valuable experience, essentially a collection of individual responses to methods of learning, 
procedures, insights and real life situations..  
For policy and decision makers of countries which are “in transition” towards becoming 
“consolidated” democracies, participation in MNO presents, all in one, (a) impetus, (b) 
shortcut and (c) formative experience in the (democratic) reform and modernization of armed 
forces. It presents an impetus since it offers a promise of tangible foreign policy benefits; and 
it is both a shortcut and formative experience because it raises important issues of 
interoperability. In the words of Serbia’s Minister of Defence, “we have to see what others 
can do in order to know where we are (Author’s note – in terms of training, equipment, 
execution of tasks ahead)”. For Serbian Armed Forces, MNO are the perfect proving ground, 
where recently built capacities and capabilities may be tested in adverse conditions.  
 
Planning Serbia’s contribution to MNO: a complex and incoherent “playing field” 
However, on the ground, SAF contribution to MNO has in so far been limited in scope and 
modest in numbers, due to a number of factors, or caveats. Some of these caveats are well 
known and have been outlined a number of times by decision makers, e.g. “Serbia will not 
send its soldiers to combat operations”.3 Others on the other hand can be understood solely 
through the prism of a wider political context of “post-Kosovo-2008-illegal-from-the-
Serbian-point-of-view-declaration-of-independence”, hiding a number of challenges or 
“traps” for those uninformed of the official discourse. This translates into (1) SAF refraining 
                                                             
2 From here on we will refer to “multinational operations” or just “MNO” in short. Other acronyms will be 
presented in brackets. 
3 This point of view is not shared by all decision (or opinion) makers. Take the MP (and member of Committee 
on Defence and Security) Vlajko Senic’s statement “Why shouldn’t Serbia’s military go to Afghanistan 
tomorrow?” http://www.youtube.com/user/bezbednostpomeri#p/u/3/1w-zh-iDeyk (delivered during the 
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy’s event, “Serbia and Multinational Operations”, June 16, 2010; statement 
available in Serbian language only) 
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from participation in NATO-led operations, since in December 2007 Serbia has excluded 
itself – to an undefined period of time – from any military alliance. Also, (2) policy and 
decision makers will look for “alternatives”, with more time and resources being allocated to 
operations led under the clout of EU’s developing Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). The fact that the EU (unlike NATO) presents its members with no system of 
collective defence seems irrelevant at the point.4  
The “playing field” of MNO is filled by the Centre for Peace Support Operations (CPO) 
under the HQ of the SAF; Department for International Military Cooperation (DIMC) in the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD); Bureau for International Cooperation (BIC) in the Ministry of 
Interior (MoI); and Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Directorate for the United Nations 
(DUN).  
These units of organization are then joined by several prime policy actors. First, it is up to 
MoD and MoI to draft the “Annual Plan of Participation in Multinational Operations” 
(Godišnji plan učešća u multinacionalnim operacijama in Serbian). What follows is a debate 
in the National Assembly, first on the level of the parliamentary committee, and then plenary, 
after which the Plan gets adopted. Every single decision to send SAF in MNO is authorized 
by the President; however, the decision to send police forces is sanctioned by the 
Government. Decisions made by the President and the Government are then enforced by 
ministers. Similar decision-making and processing system are evident in surrounding 
countries, namely Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. This may 
enable policy planners in Serbia to learn from other countries’ experiences and to improve 
their own policies. 
In theory, leading actor in Serbia’s MNO policy should be the MFA. First of all, MFA is 
involved in what is perhaps the most problematic task of all, which is choosing the operation 
Serbia will contribute to. MFA either leads or coordinates negotiations with other countries 
and most importantly, the UN. Representatives of this institution sit in an interagency 
working group tasked with planning, preparing and executing Serbia’s contribution to MNO, 
along with colleagues from the MoD, MoI, Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Ministry of 
Finance (MF).  
                                                             
4 True to the point, the Treaty of Lisbon contains a “solidarity clause” indicating that “the Union and its Member 
States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the target of a terrorist attack or the victim of 
a natural or man-made disaster”. 
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Three separate problems come to mind in relation to this. First, interagency working group is 
not a permanent, but an ad hoc body. MFA also has to take into full respect relevant 
ministries’ assessment whether contribution to a specific operation would be beneficial or 
not. There is also the omnipresent issue of (building) capacities: MNO related activities are in 
fact limited to DUN, despite the (rather recent) establishment of Directorates responsible for 
CSDP and NATO within the MFA. 
“Omnipresent” need for building capacities was evident when the first Annual Plan – which 
took 6 months to complete – was sent to ministries involved in the process. MoD, which took 
the lead when document was drafted, quizzed other institutions on their human resources, 
material equipment, and cost estimates. Besides MoI, not a single ministry expressed its 
desire to join. Less then a year later, when the second Annual Plan was drafted, results were 
the same. 
“The playing field” has been so far dominated by SAF and MoI. Advantages of including 
non-traditional actors, such as above-mentioned MFA and MoJ have not been taken into 
consideration. A different – more holistic – approach would imply that non-traditional actors, 
in line with a widened understanding of security (sector) are equally welcome. However, 
legal framework fails to mention MFA, MoJ or any other institution explicitly. Instead, a 
vague formulation, “employees in state administration” is used to describe capacities other 
than SAF and MoI. In result, there is no incentive for other actors to come aboard. There is 
no initiative at all to take part in post-conflict stabilisation through joint engagements of MoI, 
MFA and MoJ. No one seems to perceive the rising demand for election observation 
missions, where strong expertise has been developed within the civil society. Also, no one 
has contemplated the simple idea of sending agricultural engineers to facilitate agricultural 
projects. 
It is strange that in a time when regional comparative studies constitute a prerequisite to 
policy formulation, solutions adopted by, e.g. Croatia made no impression on writers of 
Serbia’s Law on MNO . Under the mandate of any Croatian participant come “activities of 
assistance to development of democracy, rule of law and human rights protection”. This 
strikes us as odd, since we have been informed that the “Croatian Law” had actually been 
consulted. That said, actors of Serbia’s security sector which might significantly contribute – 
judiciary, civil defence – are not explicitly mentioned in the Law. Judging by the official 
discourse, it is questionable whether they will be part of any future engagement at all. 
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What is also striking is how the Council for National Security (CNS) – latest and arguably 
most important addition to this framework – actually plays no role in planning and executing 
MNO. Yet this has everything to do with how the CNS was introduced in the first place: with 
the post festum Law on the Basic Structure of the Security and Intelligence Services of the 
Republic of Serbia (2007). Concerned with the growing need to gather all senior decision 
makers and help them coordinate key decisions related to security of Serbia, up until now 
CNS has never took into consideration the (growing) field of MNO. This comes as more of a 
surprise since holders of the highest authority – ministers of defence, interior and foreign 
affairs, heads of security and intelligence services, the President of the National Assembly 
and the President himself – are all members of the CNS. 
Signs of a more ambitious policy to come: 2009 to 2011 developments 
October 2009 marked the “turning point” in Serbia’s engagement. It was then that the new 
Law (full name: on using armed and other defence forces in multinational operations outside 
the borders of the Republic of Serbia) was adopted in the National Assembly. Its most 
important feature was the new definition of operations. Instead of outdated and morally 
problematic “peace operations”, a new term was adopted, “multinational operations”. This 
was followed by a wider description of possible grounds for engagement besides traditional 
peacekeeping, in which all armed forces of former Yugoslavia were since 1950’s. These new 
missions are now defined in article 2 of the Law, presented as “joint defence operations” 
“under legal acts regulating matters of defence“, and „operations of providing assistance in 
answering effects of terrorism and terrorist acts of greater size“. 
Also, with the legal framework in place, potential role of police forces has been finally 
recognized. Prior to October 2009, only did the Law on Police (2005) proscribe participation 
in MNO as a legal mission for Serbia’s police forces.5 Serbia’s police officers have so far 
been deployed – not seconded - to UN mandated and led operations.6 As well as their 
colleagues from the SAF, they took the role of (ceasefire and demarcation) observers. Only in 
MINUSTAH were they provided with an executive mandate, and able to intervene directly by 
overriding local authorities. 
                                                             
5 Law on Police (2005), article 19, paragraph 5 
6 Option of seconding personnel, where individual police officers are practically employed by the UN for a 
certain period of time has not so far been considered.  
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The Annual Plan for 2010 demanded 98 servicemen and women of the SAF deployed to UN 
operations in Congo, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Chad, Central African Republic, Lebanon and 
Cyprus, with 36 police officers taking part in UN operations in Liberia and Haiti.7 In January 
2011, Republic of Serbia was still taking part only in UN led operations, with 27 soldiers and 
11 police officers deployed at a time.  
The real shift, however, has been noted in the nature of deployment. In three operations, 
soldiers of the SAF are part of other nations’ contingents: Norwegian in Chad, Hungarian-
Slovak in Cyprus and Spanish in Lebanon. Speaking in February 2011, Serbia’s Minister of 
Defence announced how, for the very first time, SAF will join an EU operation. Two officers 
of the River Flotilla are expected to board a Greek vessel and engage (with servicemen of 
eight different countries) in prevention and combat against piracy, which is a persistent threat 
along the coast of Somalia.8 All these contributions were therefore modest in numbers, but a 
sign of things to come. 
 
Participation of SAF personnel in MNO (as of 
January 2011) 
 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
(MONUSCO) 
8 Medical 
evacuation 
team AMET-15 
comprised of 2 
medical doctors 
and 4 medical 
technicians; 1 
officer and 1 
non 
commissioned 
officer (NCO) 
at operation’s 
HQ 
Liberia 
(UNMIL) 
4 Officers – 
military 
observers 
                                                             
7 “Operations from Congo to Haiti”, Večernje novosti newspapers, June 3, 2010 
8 “Serbian Peacekeepers to join Greeks on the shores of Somalia”, Tanjug News Agency, February 11, 2011 
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Cote d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI) 
3 Officers – 
military 
observers 
 
Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) 
7 Team 
UNFICYP-1 
comprised of 1 
officer at the 
operation’s 
HQ, 2  NCOs, 
4 patrol 
members (3 
NCOs and 1 
professional 
soldier) 
Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) 
5 Team UNIFIL-
1 comprised of 
5 officers at 
operation’s HQ 
Total 27  
Participation of MoI personnel in MNO 
Liberia 
(UNMIL) 
6 Six police 
officers as part 
of the CIVPOL 
contingent 
Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) 
5 Five police 
officers, special 
forces 
designation 
(Serbian 
Gendarmerie, 
Anti-Terrorist 
Unit, etc.) 
perform 
training of 
Haitian law 
enforcement 
agencies 
Total 11  
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UN operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL) should become the destination for at least one medical 
team and, later on, a unit (of unknown size) of military police.9 In February, Assistant 
Defence Minister Tanja Miscevic presented to MPs sitting in the National Assembly 
Committee for Defence and Security that not only EUNAVFOR, but EUTM in Uganda 
should also become one of the EU led operations SAF will take part in.10 Now that the long 
awaited Security Agreement with the EU was signed, technical agreement establishing legal 
grounds for contribution of Serbia’s medical team to EUTM will soon follow.11  
Finally and most importantly, the 2011 Action Plan highlighted how, by the end of the year, 
Serbia will send an infantry platoon to UNFICYP, and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
team to UNIFIL. Final preparations are apparently under way. Also, in the “White Book of 
Defence of the Republic of Serbia” this newly found resolve was reaffirmed. Through this 
important document, decision makers announced how “for the purpose of participation in 
MNO, specific forces of the Army and the system of defence will be designated then trained 
both in country and abroad” and that “the system of defence will, through continuous 
development, present its own capacities in light of preparation for MNO“.12  
SAF are in fact very close to having its first ever fully trained unit designated for MNO. Not 
without delay, that is. As early as 2005, SAF was undertaking training of unit(s) for MNO, 
one engineers’ company, one infantry company with accompanying medical unit and a 
platoon of military police. Due to lack of political will for deployment, this resource 
eventually became outdated.13 
First designated unit being prepared for participation in an MNO is a motorized infantry 
company of the Third Brigade of Serbia’s Land Forces (SLF), comprised of soldiers from the 
31st and 32nd Infantry Battalion, 39th Logistics Battalion and 310th Engineer Battalion. This 
company will be comprised of professionals only. Training itself began on February 18, 
2010.14 Part of this unit has already taken part in an exercise organized at the Romanian 
Armed Forces (RAF) Babadag military training facility. There they worked together with 
                                                             
9 “Debate in the National Assembly: SAF participation in MNO”, Odbrana magazine No. 131: p. 6. 
10 “Serbia to join two EU led peace support operations”, Fonet News Agency, February 21, 2011 
11 “On military cooperation between Serbia and France”, Tanjug News Agency, April 7, 2011 
12 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia, 2011, “White Book of Defence of the Republic of Serbia”, 
http://www.mod.gov.rs/cir/dokumenta/strategije/bela_knjiga/Bela_Knjiga-Srpski.pdf (accessed April 28, 2011)  
13 Article 30, paragraph 3 of Serbia’s Law on (using armed forces and other defence forces in multinational 
operations outside the borders of the Republic of Serbia) states that once training is completed, unit may be used 
in a period of three years after which it must be sent to training again. 
14 “In Front of the Eyes of the World: Preparing First Designated Unit for Multinational Operations”, Odbrana 
magazine No. 129, p. 20-21  
10 
 
members of both RAF and the US Army, preparing for deployment to ISAF operation in 
Afghanistan. 
In February 2011, second part of collective training was initiated, to be completed in July 
2011. After this the unit will be sent as a whole to military exercises which are carried out 
with live ammunition. Then every soldier and (commanding) officer will be separately 
evaluated. At the very end of this lengthy process, SAF will have at its disposal one infantry 
platoon; one section of military police; and one NBC section. Due to the requirement of 
rotation of forces, one third of the resource provided by the designated unit will be available 
for mission at any time.15 
One should not jump to a conclusion, however. Earlier in 2010, while personnel was 
undertaking its first tours of duty within the Norwegian contingent, policy makers discussed 
whether  SAF can manage to send an entire field hospital on its own. After it became evident 
that funds necessary for sending 120 to 150 soldiers (doctors, technicians, force protection 
etc.) were nowhere to be found, this idea was discarded.16 It therefore remains to be seen 
whether the end of 2011 deadline is realistic. 
 
Internal limiting factors: some issues are here to stay 
Yet many of the issues that hamper decision makers’ ambition for greater engagement still 
have nothing to do with horizontal cooperation between key actors. First, MoI’s capacities for 
managing police officers’ contribution to MNO continue to be extremely limited. By acts that 
regulate the internal organization of this Ministry, only two employees have been assigned to 
duties related to MNO; only one position has been actually staffed. This stands in sharp 
contrast with SAF’s CPO, where a number of soldiers and civil servants – close to 70 – are 
involved in different phases of Serbia’s contribution.  
MoI also encounters a range of problems when planning and implementing language training. 
Since 2003, OSCE Mission to Serbia has supported foreign language training, but with partial 
success. This was due to several key factors. Any intensive course would ask officers to take 
a four month long leave from duty in order to keep up. Instead, groups met several times per 
                                                             
15 This “logic” of rotation is simple: one third of the unit is deployed, one third is preparing, and one third is 
resting and refitting. In this particular case, one third of a company comprises a platoon, while one third of a 
platoon comprises a section. 
16 “Serbia in Chad peace support operation”, Euro Atlantic Initiative magazine, No. 11 
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week, for several hours, all in course of several months. In addition, course contents were not 
adjusted to police officers’ needs, and did not refer to terminology police officers use when 
handling their daily business.  
Limited knowledge of English and French (meaning: limited numbers of speakers of these 
two languages) could also be one of the reasons why the SAF have still not committed a 
compact unit to any MNO. Yet, since obtaining interoperability has been perceived as one of 
SAF strategic priorities, Military Academy of Serbia has been implementing NATO 
STANAG 6001 when organizing and executing foreign language training. Above-mentioned 
designated unit has received its own centre for learning of English language, equipped with 
lecture rooms, high-quality audio facilities and computers. 
Apart from debriefing which is mandatory and is executed no later then ten days upon return, 
there seems to be no other mechanism for institutionalization of knowledge and experience 
members of SAF and MoI gain while in operation. Only in SAF there is an informal practice 
of assigning servicemen and women to organizational units concerned with matters of civil-
military cooperation (CIMIC). In reverse, this CIMIC approach shaped in Serbia, in post 
conflict, multiethnic environment could be later used as a useful tool in MNO. This policy 
has nevertheless been so far neglected. 
Single greatest challenge or obstacle to any future participation is interoperability, or the lack 
of ability to take part in joint operations with other countries’ armed forces. At the moment, 
platoon sized formation is at best what SAF can offer to the UN, EU, or any other partner. 
Smaller in size than a battalion or a company, incapable of independent action, this formation 
could be viable only within a “parent” contingent. This is exactly the path decision makers in 
Serbia have chosen, as we have displayed before. As long as servicemen and women are sent 
within a smaller team, there is no problem. The moment a contingent greater in size gets 
deployed there is a strong chance that some of the assigned soldiers (or police officers) will 
not understand any language other than their own. For instance, when Romanian forces 
deployed to Iraq, knowledge of English was fairly limited in the lower ranks: 80% of officers, 
60% of NCOs and no more than 40% of soldiers spoke the language. RAF overcame this by 
having fluent speakers for liaison officers. 
Right up until 2010, even if individual servicemen or women have participated in an 
operation there was no guarantee that his or hers career might advance in any way. This has 
changed since: in internal vacancy notices published in SAF magazines (“Odbrana”), official 
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journals and web sites, when deciding on candidates to choose, previous experience of 
deployment to an MNO is taken as a factor. 
Since until January 2011 the full professionalization of the SAF participation was possible 
only on voluntary basis, the only remaining incentive for soldiers and police officers was 
money. When abroad, Serbia’s “blue helmets” are paid from $1050 to $3000, not counting 
the salary they regularly receive at home. It is therefore easy to understand why over 5,000 
members of SAF are open to participation in MNO.17 Still, as CPO representatives’ had 
stated repeatedly, money plays a role only up to a certain level.  
 
Conclusion remarks: a coherent and more open-minded system is needed 
Adoption of the 2011 Annual Plan speaks of significant political ambition regarding Serbia 
and MNO. However, only after a designated unit is deployed, Serbia’s presence will be felt 
and appreciated. The existing system needs to become coherent, with improved capacity to 
run the process, widen the base of professionals who are capable and willing to deploy, and 
raise the level of interoperability. The fact that the draft of the Law was written by the MoD 
left a lasting impression on state policy towards MNO: it is largely militarized and fails to 
perceive other, namely civilian actors in the arena.  
The questions that remain unanswered are what our interest is, and where and how do we 
want to participate. So far, attitude of MoD and MoI towards MNO has been fragmented and 
at times too much focused on public relations. Rather shy and almost unwilling presence of 
MFA translates into a lack of initiative coming from other ministries. This has created a 
confusing image in the public opinion and led towards criticism. Population stays largely 
uninformed and confused on how exactly Serbia might benefit by participating in MNO. This 
is a risk that decision makers can not afford – if increasing participation is already on the 
table.  
 
 
 
                                                             
17 “Debate in the National Assembly”, Ibid  
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